The NewMINT Interpretation Assistance System:
United States Constitution First Amendment's Initial 1344 Interpretations
by Layman E. Allen and Adam W. Tury
Introduction
For more than a quarter of a century Charles Saxon and I put our best efforts into attempting to devise a version of the MINT System (Multiple INTerpretation System for assisting interpretation of legal text) that would produce Arrow Diagrams of legal interpretations that would be more satisfactory to legal audiences. We failed completely in the effort to formulate a program that would automatically produce an Arrow Diagram representing the sentential logical structure of the interpretative text of a legal provision in the margin to the left of the interpretative text expressed in the LEGAL RELATIONS language. To facilitate a legal reader's ease of understanding the Arrow Diagram's relationship to the interpretive text the sentence, abbreviations of the Arrow Diagram would be on the same line as the beginning of the constituent sentence of the interpretation to the right. The best that we were able to achieve in our many years of effort was a program (1) that produced Arrow Diagrams that entirely preceded the interpretive text and appeared above and NOT beside it, and (2) that severely limited a user's ability to easily compare the logical structure of the Arrow Diagram with that of the interpretive text. In addition, in those earlier and unsatisfactory versions, when the Arrow Diagrams reached a certain size, they no longer could be produced entirely by program without final manual-editing.
There is, however, a happy ending to the story. During the summer following Adam Tury's completion of his undergraduate education in the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department of the College of Engineering at the University of Michigan, he and I tackled anew the task of producing a more satisfactory version of the Arrow Diagrams in the NewMINT System. Instead of the Pascal and C++ used in the earlier attempts, this newest effort was undertaken with Java 2 as the programming language. The result was that before the end of the summer, we had a prototype of the NewMINT System being used to analyze the 1344 different interpretations here of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Seven Ambiguities of the First Amendment
The text of the First Amendment is the following single sentence.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
In interpreting legal text it is the indeterminacies in the meaning of the text that needs to be carefully examined. The indeterminacies are of two types: that arising from vagueness of the terms used and that arising from the ambiguity of the terms used. The more usual legal interpretation of legal text deals with the vagueness of legal text - just where one draws the line in an infnite continuum of legal meaning: answering the question about which examples fall within the meaning of the term being interpreted and which examples fall without its meaning for purposes of the particular dispute being considered. The more neglected form of interpretation of legal text, and the dimension focused upon in NewMINT analysis, is the indeterminacy arising from ambiguity of legal text: just which from among a relatively small finite number of alternative interpretations of a term is the most appropriate interpretation for purposes of the particular dispute being considered.
The seven ambiguities of the First amendment are summarized in Figure 1, and then each is considered in more detail in the subsequent discussion. The text of the First Amendment is presented in Figure 1 below in bold font like this; alternative interpretive choices in this non-proportional font; and [insertions to the text, in square brackets]. Underlined ambiguities are semantic. Non-underlined ones are syntactic. "Respecting" is ambiguous both ways. In syntactic ambiguities A, B, C and D indicate different scopes of reference - in general, A the narrowest scope, D the broadest, etc. Capitalized terms are defined terms in the LEGAL RELATIONS language, an example of a cure for one of the most badly-needed reforms in legislative drafting - the signaling of defined terms.
Figure 1. Seven Ambiguities of the First Amendment
Congress shall make no law
│││││││ (7) ??(G,F,E,D,C,B,A)
││││││└─►A has a DUTY to INTERESTED PERSONS to make no such law
│││││└─►B has POWER to make such a law but has a DUTY to INTERESTED PERSONS to make no such law
││││└─►C lacks POWER to make such a law and has a DUTY to INTERESTED PERSONS to make no such law
│││└─►D lacks POWER to make such a law and has DISCRETION about whether to attempt such a law
││└─►E has POWER to make such a law and has DISCRETION about whether to attempt such a law1
│└─►F has POWER to make such a law and has DISCRETION about whether to attempt such a law
│ and has a DUTY to INTERESTED PERSONS to make no such law
└─►G will make no such law in the future
respecting
│ │ │ │ ││ (2) ??(B,A)
│ │ │ │ │└─►A giving respect to
│ │ │ │ └─►B with respect to
│ │ │ │ (1)??(D,C,B,A)
├►┼►┼►┴─►A an establishment of religion, or
│ │ │ │││ (3) ??(C,B,A)
│ │ │ ││└─►A a religious institution [an existing religious organization]
│ │ │ │└─►B establishing a religion [starting a religious movement]
│ │ │ └─►C either of the two above
├►┼►┴───►B prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
├►┴─────►C abridging
│ │ │ (4) ??(B,A)
│ ├►┴─►A the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
│ └───►B┐
└───────►D───────┴─ the right of the people
: ├─peaceably
: │ │ │ (5) ??(B,A)
: ├►┴──┴►A to assemble,and (6) ??(B,A)
: └─────►B to petition to government for redress of grievances.
└──and
│ │ (6) ??(B,A)
├─►┴─►A Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
│ [(i.e., logical product of sentence parts)] to petition to government for redress of grievances.
└────►B Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to assemble AND
(i.e., conjunction of complete sentences) Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people
to petition to government for redress of grievances.
Each of the 1344 different interpretations of the First Amendment has a unique seven-letter name that represents the different answers given to the questions about the seven ambiguities encountered in the statement of the First Amendment below. You can determine the interpretation of the First Amendment that you regard as most appropriate in terms of the resolution of the specified seven ambiguities by selecting the letters below to each of the seven questions that you regard as the most appropriate alternative. The resulting seven-letter combination will represent the interpretation that you regard as the most appropriate one of the First Amendment in terms of these seven specified ambiguities. Then the statement of the interpretation that you regard as the most appropriate one can be accessed by double-clicking on the seven-letter icon of that interpretation in the FirstAmend.min_full_interpretations Folder available on the Internet at: http://alf-learning.org/Development/NewMINTInterpretations/Constitution_US/Amendment_I/FirstAmend.min_interpretations.html
There are at least seven ambiguities the First Amendment of the United States Constitution: four syntactic ambiguities in the scope of reference of terms (one of which is an ambiguity of logical structure) and three semantic ambiguities (one of which is a normative-logical as well as a semantic ambiguity). The first ambiguity is a syntactic ambiguity in the scope of reference of the word "respecting".
Ambiguity 1. Interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting"
Consider the interpretation of the scope of reference the word "respecting" in the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least four alternative interpretations of the scope of reference of "respecting" to be considered. Which of the four following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" in the First Amendment: 1A or 1B or 1C or 1D?
1A. The first alternative interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" gives it the narrowest scope of reference. The scope of reference of "respecting" can refer to various combinations of the following four phrases:
1. an establishment of religion
2. prohibiting the free exercise thereof
3. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
4. the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of
grievances
This narrowest interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" has it referring to only phrase 1 on this list of four phrases.
1B. The second alternative interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" gives it the second narrowest scope of reference in having it refer to only phrase 1 and phrase 2.
1C. The third alternative interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" gives it the third narrowest scope of reference in having it refer to phrase 1, phrase 2, and phrase 3.
1D. The fourth alternative interpretation of the scope of reference of "respecting" gives it the broadest scope of reference in having it refer to all four of phrases 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Ambiguity 2. Interpretation of the semantic meaning of "respecting"
The second ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment also involves the word "respecting". It is a semantic ambiguity in the meaning of the word "respecting" in the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion". Consider the interpretation of the meaning of "respecting" in the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least two alternative interpretations of the meaning of "respecting" to be considered. Should the word "respecting" in the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion" be interpreted as "respecting" in the sense of "giving respect to" so that the First Amendment would be asserting "Congress shall make no law giving respect to an establishment of religion, that is, indulging a religion"? Or, alternatively, should "respecting" in the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion" be interpreted as "respecting" in the broader sense of "with respect to" so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be "Congress shall make no law with respect to an establishment of religion, that is, indulging or depriving a religion or having effect upon religion in any manner whatsoever"? Which of the two following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the meaning of "respecting" in the First Amendment: 2A or 2B?
2A In the First Amendment the word "respecting" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense of "giving respect to" so that the subsidiary assertion involved is: Congress shall make no law giving respect to an establishment of religion.
2B. In the First Amendment the word "respecting" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the broader sense of "with respect to" so that the subsidiary assertion involved is: Congress shall make no law with respect to an establishment of religion.
Ambiguity 3. Interpretation of semantic meaning of "an establishment of religion"
The third ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment is a semantic ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase "an establishment of religion". Consider the interpretation of the semantic meaning of this phrase in the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least three alternative interpretations of the meaning of "an establishment of religion" to be considered. Should the phrase "an establishment of religion" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "a religious establishment (an institution)" so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment (an institution)"? Or, alternatively, should the phrase "an establishment of religion" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "the establishing of a religion" so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishing of a religion"? Or, alternatively, should the phrase "an establishment of religion" be interpreted as being used both in the sense of "a religious establishment (an institution)" and also in the sense of "the establishing of a religion" so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment (an institution), AND
(2) Congress shall make no law respecting the establishing of a religion?
Which of the three following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the meaning of "an establishment of religion" in the First Amendment: 3A or 3B or 3C?
3A. In the First Amendment the phrase "an establishment of religion" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense of "a religious establishment (an institution)" so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be: "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment (an institution)".
3B. In the First Amendment the phrase "an establishment of religion" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense of "the establishing of a religion" so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishing of a religion".
3C. In the First Amendment the phrase "an establishment of religion" is most appropriately interpreted as being used both in the sense of "a religious establishment (an institution)" and also in the sense of "the establishing of a religion" so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment (an institution), AND
(2) Congress shall make no law respecting the establishing of a religion.
Ambiguity 4. Interpretation of the scope of reference of "abridging"
The fourth ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment is a syntactic ambiguity in the scope of reference of the word "abridging". Consider the interpretation of the scope of reference the word "abridging" in the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least two alternative interpretations to the scope of reference of "abridging" to be considered. Should the word "abridging", by giving full effect to the semicolon punctuation, be interpreted as referring only to the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press"? Or, alternatively, should the semicolon punctuation after "press" be disregarded as a "scrivener's error" and the scope of "abridging" be interpreted to include the phrase, "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances", as well as including the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press".
By the first interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting only the following subsidiary assertion involving abridging:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
(2) Congress shall make no law ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
By the second interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting at least the following two subsidiary assertions involving abridging:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
(2) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
Which of the two following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the scope of reference of "abridging" in the First Amendment: 4A or 4B?
4A. In the First Amendment the word "abridging" refers only to the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press".
4B. In the First Amendment the word "abridging" refers to not only the phrase, "the freedom of speech, or of the press" but also to the phrase, "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances".
Ambiguity 5. Interpretation of the scope of reference of "peaceably"
The fifth ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment is a syntactic ambiguity in the scope of reference of the word "peaceably". Consider the interpretation of the scope of reference the word "peaceably" in the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least two alternative interpretations of the scope of reference of "peaceably" to be considered. Should the word "peaceably" be interpreted as referring only to the phrase "to assemble"? By this first interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting at least the following two subsidiary assertions:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble.
(2) Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people to petition to government
for a redress of grievances.
Or, alternatively, should the scope of "peaceably" be interpreted to refer the phrase, "to petition to government for a redress of grievances" as well as referring to the phrase "to assemble"? By this second interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting at least the following two subsidiary assertions:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble.
(2) Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to petition to
government for a redress of grievances.
Which of the two following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the scope of reference of "peaceably" in the First Amendment: 5A or 5B?
5A. In the First Amendment the word "peaceably" refers only to the phrase "to assemble".
5B. In the First Amendment the word "peaceably" refers to not only the phrase, "to assemble" but also to the phrase, "to petition to government for a redress of grievances".
Ambiguity 6. Interpretation of the scope of reference of "and"
The sixth ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment is a syntactic ambiguity in the logical structure of the scope of reference of the word "and". This "and" appears between the phrase, "to assemble", and the phrase, "to petition to government for a redress of grievances".
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least two alternative interpretations to the scope of reference of "and" to be considered. Should the word "and" be interpreted as a connective that refers to and connects the two phrases "to assemble" and "to petition to government for a redress of grievances", resulting in a logical product of the two phrases? By this interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting at least the following subsidiary assertion:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people peaceably to -- do the
combination of both of the following -- to assemble, and to petition to government for a
redress of grievances.
Or, alternatively, should the "and" be interpreted as a connective that refers to and connects the two complete sentences: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble" and "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people ... to petition to government for a redress of grievances" -- resulting in a conjunction of the two sentences? By this interpretation this part of the First Amendment is being interpreted as asserting at least the following two subsidiary assertions:
(1) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble.
(2) Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people to petition to government
for a redress of grievances.
Which of the two following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the scope of reference of "and" in the First Amendment: 6A or 6B?
6A. In the First Amendment the word "and" refers to and connects the phrase "to assemble" to the phrase "to petition to government for a redress of grievances" and indicates the logical product of the two phrases.
6B. In the First Amendment the word "and" refers to and connects the complete sentence "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble" to the complete sentence "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to petition to government for a redress of grievances".
Ambiguity 7. Interpretation of semantic meaning of the phrase "shall make no"
The seventh ambiguity in the interpretation of the First Amendment is a semantic ambiguity that is also a normative-logical ambiguity. This ambiguity is in the meaning of the phrase "shall make no" in the sentence "Congress shall make no law". Consider the interpretation of the semantic meaning the phrase "shall make no" in the sentence "Congress shall make no law" of the First Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition to government for a redress of grievances.
There are at least seven alternative interpretations of the meaning of "shall make no" to be considered.
Should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "having a DUTY to INTERESTED PERSONS NOT to make" -- so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be:
(1) Congress has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to make a certain kind of law?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "Congress having POWER to make a specified kind of law and also having a DUTY to interested persons NOT to exercise that POWER" -- so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to exercise that POWER?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "Congress lacking POWER to make a specified kind of law but also having a DUTY to interested persons NOT to engage in activity that would exercise such POWER, were Congress to have such POWER" -- so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress lacks POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to engage in activity that would
exercise such POWER, were Congress to have such POWER?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "Congress lacking POWER to make a specified kind of law but also having DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to engage in activities that would attempt to exercise such POWER, were Congress to have such POWER" -- so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress lacks POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to
engage in activities that would attempt to exercise such POWER, were Congress to have
such POWER?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "Congress having POWER to make a specified kind of law but also having DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to attempt to exercise that POWER -- so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to
engage in activities that would attempt to exercise such POWER?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the sense of "Congress having POWER to make a specified kind of law but also having DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to attempt to exercise that POWER -- so that the subsidiary assertions involved would be:
(1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons to engage in activities
that would attempt to exercise such POWER, AND
(3) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to exercise such POWER?
Or, alternatively, should the phrase "shall make no" be interpreted as being used in the non-normative, descriptive sense of predicting that Congress would NOT make a certain kind of law in the future -- so that the subsidiary assertion involved would be:
(1) Congress will NOT make a certain kind of law in the future.
Which of the seven following alternatives is the most appropriate interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "shall make no" in the First Amendment: 7A or 7B or 7C or 7D or 7E or 7F or 7G?
7A. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that:
(1) Congress has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to make a specified kind of law.
7B. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used the sense such that:
(1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to exercise that POWER.
7C. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that:
(1) Congress lacks POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to engage in activity that would
exercise such POWER, were Congress to have such POWER.
7D. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that:
(1) Congress lacks POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT
to engage in activities that would attempt to exercise such POWER, were Congress to
have such POWER.
7E. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that:
(1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to
attempt to exercise that POWER.
7F. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that
1) Congress has POWER to make a specified kind of law, AND
(2) Congress also has DISCRETION with respect to interested persons whether or NOT to
attempt to exercise that POWER, AND
(3) Congress also has a DUTY to interested persons NOT to exercise that POWER.
7G. In the First Amendment the phrase "shall make no" is most appropriately interpreted as being used in the sense such that:
(1) Congress will NOT make a specified kind of law in the future.
Generating Your Interpretation of the First Amendment by Resolving These Seven Ambiguities
To discover how this article can be used to interact with a NewMINT System for the First Amendment on the Internet, you should answer the seven questions about the seven ambiguities above and thereby generate the 7-letter short-name for your interpretation of the First Amendment in terms of resolving these seven ambiguities. For example, IF your answer to each of the seven questions is Alternative A, THEN the short-name generated will be: AAAAAAA. You should then access the Internet with your favorite browser and access this site:
/Development/NewMINTInterpretations/Constitution_US/Amendment_I/FirstAmend.min_interpretations.html
There, by following instructions and clicking on the AAAAAAA short-name, you can access the AAAAAAA Interpretation and its accompanying Arrow Diagram, namely that shown in Figure 2 below.
The Evolving Nature of NewMINT Systems
In the operational version of the NewMINT Program for the First Amendment, as well as all other legal provisions analyzed by the NewMINT System, in addition to the Alternative Responses listed for each of the seven ambiguities analyzed, there will always be a residual alternative asserting "None (or Neither) of the above. This is the response to be selected by users of the NewMINT System who do NOT find their responses among those listed. When a user of a NewMINT System has such a response, he or she is given an email address where they can send their response so that such new responses can be added to the system for the benefit of subsequent users (and for their own benefit as well, so that they will be able to generate the Normalized Versions and Arrow Diagrams of their own interpretations). This illustrates the cooperative and evolving nature of NewMINT Interpretation Systems and the manner in which they take advantage of the rapidly developing technology in communications systems.
Figure 2. Interpretation AAAAAAA
>┐ IF
univ_con 1. all other relevant conditions are
│ fulfilled for the application of the
│ First Amendment of the United States
│ Constitution,
┌▼ THEN
│>┐ 2. IF
│ ├─a2A3A───┐ A) a law is giving respect to a
│ │ │
religious institution, OR
│ ├─Spro────┤ B) a law is prohibiting the free
│ │ │ exercise of religion, OR
│ ├─a4AA────┤ C) a law is abridging the freedom of
│ │ │ speech, OR
│ ├─a4AB────┤ D) a law is abridging the freedom of the
│ │ │ press, OR
│ └─a4A5A6A─┤ E) a law is ... the right of the people
│ │ peaceably to assemble and to petition
│ │ to government for redress of
│ │ grievances,
│ ▼ THEN
│ c7A F) Congress has a DUTY to interested
│ persons NOT to make that law,
o BUT OTHERWISE
▼ THEN
n_apply 3. the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not apply in this
situation.
An example of such evolution occurred with respect to this very First Amendment example of a NewMINT System. When the first version of it was shown to retired Judge William A. Norris of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the list of alternative responses for the seventh ambiguity did NOT include the Alternatives E and F; they were NOT among those included. Judge Norris quickly discovered that the interpretation that he regarded as most appropriate was NOT listed among the alternatives. When he offered Alternative E as the one that he regarded as the most appropriate resolution of this seventh ambiguity, that alternative, along with Alternative F, was immediately added to the list. By such means, the use of NewMINT Systems can add important and useful cooperative and evolutionary dimensions to the logical analysis of important legal text.
Figure 3. Interpretation ABCBBBE (Judge Norris's Interpretation)
>┐ IF
univ_con 1. all other relevant conditions are
│ fulfilled for the application of the
│ First Amendment of the United States
│ Constitution,
┌▼ THEN
│>┐ 2. IF
│ ├─a2B3A────┐ A) a law is with respect to a religious
│ │ │ institution, OR
│ ├─a2B3B────┤ B) a law is with respect to establishing
│ │ │ a religion, OR
│ ├─Spro─────┤ C) a law is prohibiting the free
│ │ │ exercise of religion, OR
│ ├─a4BA─────┤ D) a law is abridging the freedom of
│ │ │ speech, OR
│ ├─a4BB─────┤ E) a law is abridging the freedom of the
│ │ │ press, OR
│ ├─a4B5B6BA─┤ F) a law is abridging the right of the
│ │ │ people peaceably to assemble, OR
│ └─a4B5B6BB─┤ G) a law is abridging the right of the
│ │ people peaceably to petition to
│ │ government for redress of grievances,
│ ▼ THEN
│ c7E H) Congress has POWER to create that
│ law, AND Congress has DISCRETION with
│ respect to interested persons about
│ whether or NOT to attempt to make
│ such a law,
o BUT OTHERWISE
▼ THEN
n_apply 3. the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not apply in this situation.
Judge Norris's sound insights have helped clarify my own interpretation of the aspects of the First Amendment that are focused upon in the seven ambiguities considered. My interpretation in these respects is the Interpretation ABCBBBF shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Interpretation ABCBBBF
>┐
IF
univ_con 1. all other relevant conditions are
│ fulfilled for the application of the
│ First Amendment of the United States
│ Constitution,
┌▼ THEN
│>┐ 2. IF
│
├─a2B3A────┐ A) a law is with respect to a religious
│
│ │ institution, OR
│
├─a2B3B────┤ B) a law is with respect to establishing
│ │
│ a religion, OR
│
├─Spro─────┤ C) a law is prohibiting the free
│ │
│ exercise of religion, OR
│ ├─a4BA─────┤ D) a law is abridging the freedom of
│ │
│ speech, OR
│ ├─a4BB─────┤ E) a law is abridging the freedom of the
│ │
│ press, OR
│ ├─a4B5B6BA─┤ F) a law is abridging the right of the
│ │ │ people peaceably to assemble, OR
│ └─a4B5B6BB─┤ G) a law is abridging the right of the
│
│ people peaceably to petition to
│ │ government for redress of grievances,
│ ▼ THEN
│ c7F H) Congress has POWER to create that
│ law, AND Congress has DISCRETION with
│ respect to interested persons about
│ whether or NOT to attempt to make
│ such a law, AND Congress has a DUTY
│ to interested persons NOT to make
│ such a law,
o BUT OTHERWISE
▼ THEN
n_apply 3. the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not apply in this situation.
Conclusion
The NewMINT Interpretation-Assistance System is a significant milestone in the effective interpretation of legal text. It finally achieves what has been an elusive goal: the effective coordination of (a) the clear expression of the logical structure of legal text by Arrow Diagrams with (b) the precise and complete expression of the content of legal text both in Normalized Form and in terms of LEGAL RELATIONS. More than a quarter of a century of intensive effort has been poured into this task, but success is now in hand. Recognition of the logical blindness that has characterized efforts to interpret legal text throughout human history only began in the second half of the Twentieth Century2, although seeds of recognition appeared with Wesley Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions1 in 1913. The availability now of effective systems for assisting fully - semantically, syntactically, and logically - in the interpretation of legal text can make an extraordinary difference in the systematic exploration, coordination, accumulation, and understanding of legal knowledge. The extraordinary complexity of a single sentence of legal text is exemplified in this article by a NewMINT analysis of the 44-word First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The seven ambiguities detected so far in the First Amendment give rise to 1344 different alternative interpretations of what that single sentence might be interpreted as asserting. With NewMINT Interpretation-Assistance Systems as the keystone of the arch, we are on the threshold of achieving a more scientific and legally realistic view of our legal institutions.
References
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Reasoning," 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). Reprinted with a New Foreword by Arthur L. Corbin by Yale University Press, London & New Haven (1964).
2. Allen, Layman E., Symbolic Logic: A Razor‑Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 Yale Law Journal 833 (1957).
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E., Automatic Retrieval of Legal Literature: Why and How (with Robin B.S.
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E., The PLAIN LANGUAGE Game: Legal Writing Made Clear by Structuring it
Well, Proceedings of the International Workshop on FORMAL METHODS IN LAW
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Annual Conference on Law and Technology at the University of Houston Law School, August 9 23, 1984. Published in COMPUTER POWER AND
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(AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TEXTS), Florence, Italy, September 3 6,
1985. Published in AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TEXTS: LOGIC,
INFORMATICS, LAW, Edited by Antonio A. Martino and Fiorenza Socci Natali,
pp. 385 450, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1986.
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3 of the Associated Labour Act of Yugoslavia, (with Radovan Stipanovic)
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University, Cavtat, Yugoslavia, May 12 15, 1986.
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at Northeastern University, Boston, May 27 29, 1987, and published in the
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STUDY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY,
Autumn Issue, 1987.
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E., Exploring computer Aided Generation of Questions for Normalizing legal
Rules, (with Charles S. Saxon) Presented at the Second Annual conference on Law
and Technology at the University of Houston Law School, June 24 28,
1985. Published in COMPUTING POWER AND LEGAL LANGUAGE, Edited by
Charles Walter, GREENWOOD Publishers (1988).
38. Allen, Layman E., Multiple Interpretations of the Logical
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(with Charles S. Saxon) Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference
Symposium on LOGIC PROGRAMMING, Seattle, Washington, August 15 19, 1988.
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Automatic Generation of a Legal Expert System of Article 12 of the Inheritance
Act of Serbia, (with Charles S. Saxon). Proceedings of the 10th
International Symposium on COMPUTERS AT THE UNIVERSITY, June 6 10, 1988,
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the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Guidelines 9
and 10 on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(with Radovan Stipanovic). Proceedings of the 10th
International Symposium on COMPUTERS AT THE UNIVERSITY, June 6 10,
1988, Dubrovnik/Cavtat, Yugoslavia
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of Section 7 (2) of the United Kingdom Data Protection Act 1984 (with
Charles S. Saxon) Proceedings of the 4th International Congress on Law and
Computers, Corte Suprema di Cassazione Centro Elettronico
di Documentazione and Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, May 16 21, 1988,
Rome, Italy,
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Autostructural Legal Expert Systems by Means of the Universal Condition (with
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the University, Dubrovnik/Cavtat, Yugoslavia, June 5-9, 1989.
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E., Relationship of Expert Systems to the Operation of a Legal System
(with Charles S. Saxon), Invited paper for the Third International
Congress on LOGICA, INFORMATICA, DIRRITO (LEGAL EXPERT
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Saxon), Proceedings of EXPERT SYSTEMS AND LAW: An International Conference on
Law and Artificial Intelligence Organized by the University of Bologna on
the Occasion of its 9th Centennial in Cooperation with RATIO JURIS,
an International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Bologna,
Italy, May 3-5, 1989, published in 3 RATIO JURIS 272 318 (July 1990).
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E., Automatic Generation of a Legal Expert System of Model Penal Code
Section 213.1 Rape and Related Offenses, (with Charles S. Saxon).
Proceedings of the 17th American Society for Information Science Mid Year
Meeting, May 15 18, 1988, Ann Arbor, MI. Published in LAW, DECISION
MAKING, AND MICROCOMPUTERS, Edited by S. Nagel, pp. 243 269, GREENWOOD
Publishers (1991).
47. Allen, Layman E., More IA Needed in AI: Interpretation Assistance
for Coping with the Problem of Multiple Structural
Interpretations (with Charles S. Saxon) presented at the Third International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, June 25 28, 1991, St.
Catherine's College, Oxford, England and published in the
Proceedings of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).
48. Allen, Layman E., Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity in the
Logical Structure of Legal Drafting by Means of the Prescribed
Definitions of the A Hohfeld Structural Language (with Charles S. Saxon),
IX THEORIA No. 21 135 172 (September, 1994). Invited paper for the
Conference in Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Istituto per la
documentazione giuridica of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, TOWARD A
GLOBAL EXPERT SYSTEM IN LAW: Selected Examples from Health and
Environmental law, Florence, Italy, December 13, 1993.
49. Allen, Layman E., A-Hohfeld: A Language for Robust Structural
Representation of Knowledge in the Legal Domain to Build Interpretation
Assistance Expert Systems (with Charles S. Saxon), Invited paper for the
First International Workshop on DEONTIC LOGIC IN COMPUTER SCIENCE,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11 13, 1991, published in DEONTIC
LOGIC IN COMPUTER SCIENCE: Normative System Specification (Edited by John
Jules Ch. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 205 224
(1993).
50. Allen, Layman E., Enriching the Deontic Fundamental Legal
Conceptions of Hohfeld, Invited paper presented at the 25th Anniversary
Celebration of the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, March
15 17, l995, Oslo University, Oslo, Norway, to be published in
Anniversary Anthology in Computers and Law, Edited by Jon Bing & O.
Torvund, TANO publ., Oslo.
51. Allen, Layman E., Better Language, Better Thought, Better
Communication: The A HOHFELD Language for Legal Analysis (with Charles S.
Saxon), Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Law, May 21 24, 1995, University of Maryland, College
Park, Md.
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of Hohfeld to LEGAL RELATIONS: Refining the Enrichment of Solely Deontic
LEGAL RELATIONS, pp. 1-26 in DEONTIC LOGIC, AGENCY AND NORMATIVE SYSTEMS,
(Edited by Mark A. Brown and Jose Carmo), Springer and the British Computer
Society, 1996. Presented at DEON '96: Third International Workshop on
Deontic Logic in Computer Science, Sesimbra, Portugal, 11-13, January
1966. (Volume in the WORKSHOPS IN COMPUTING Series edited by C. J. van
Rijsbergen)
53. Allen, Layman E., Achieving Fluency in Modernized and
Formalized Hohfeld: Puzzles and Games for the LEGAL RELATIONS Language,
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
Law, June 29-July 3, 1997, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.
54. Allen, Layman E., The Language of LEGAL RELATIONS (LLR): Useful in a
Legal Ontologist's Toolkit? Paper presented at the First International Workshop
on Legal Ontologies, 4 July 1997, Organized in conjunction with the Sixth
International Conference on ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE and LAW, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia..
55. Allen, Layman E., The Legal Argument Games of LEGAL RELATIONS
on the Internet, Paper presented at the 1st Australasion Legal Information
Institute Conference on Computerization of Law via the Internet, AustLII,
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia, 25 27 June 1997. (Forthcoming in
The Journal of Law and Information Science (print journal) and E Law
(electronic journal))
56. Allen, Layman E., Anatomy of a MINT System for Article 14 of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods,
Paper presented at the Workshop on Legal Expert Systems for the Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 29 June 1997, University of Melbourne, Melbourne,
Australia.
57.
Allen, Layman E., Some Examples of Using the LEGAL RELATIONS
Language in the Legal Domain: Applied Deontic Logic, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
535-573 (1998).
58. Allen, Layman E., LawToe: Introduction to the Game Rules of The
Legal Argument Game of LEGAL
RELATIONS (with Sandra Bartlett, 2003).
59. Allen, Layman E., The Legal Argument Game of LEGAL RELATIONS
(designed to facilitate becoming fluent In the LEGAL RELATIONS Language, with
Sandra Bartlett, 2003).
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